Yes, but the people are sometimes wrong, whereas the correct elitist is right 100% of the time. That's why it's so important to find the right elitist and crown him emperor...
Dean, you're the first guy who explained exactly how this kind of thing works. I could see how useful it may be for predicting and preventing terrorist attacks --- and not to derail the conversation --- but wouldn't that be cluing our enemies into where we expect them to be instead? I mean, surely they can find out the results of these predictions markets. That is my rationale for objecting to it in retrospect, not some willy-nilly notion of political correctness.
Well Jay, the idea the Pentagon had was to run it as a secret project within the intelligence community. With congressional oversight and all that of course.
So the only people who'd know the predictions being tested would be our government officials. Although I'm sure they'd be declassified over time.
Damn. Come to think of it, that could have been good though. Plus if all things go well no one would win such a betting market, since we'd be able to prevent something from happening, ergo, someone getting confirmation of a prediction he bet on.
Sad, although I think it would helpful. Too bad the PC crowd got what they wanted crybabying their desires into policy.
Too bad the PC crowd got what they wanted crybabying their desires into policy.
Actually, Jay, you pointed out one of the very non-PC problems with this idea: as soon as the predictive power of the market became apparent, allowing the government to put preventive measures in place, this would have to be "priced into" the market. In other words, people would no longer be betting just on the likelihood of a terrorist attack, but also on the probability that if the market agrees with their assessment, then the attack would be prevented. Whatever the morality of valuing money over the lives that would be lost in a terrorist attack, the simple fact is that people would be much less willing to risk money if they could be fairly sure that the government would act to prevent the attacks they were predicting. So really, as soon as the market started working, it would also start to lose its effectiveness. This is true even if money were not involved, since prestige or credibility would simply replace dollars as the currency of the market.
Really, the same is true in the real stock market, which is exactly why people argue for minimal government interference: if people are aware of a party with a disproportionate ability to affect the outcomes of their bets, then they have to factor this knowledge into the decision. If this party's behavior is easily predictable given a certain set of conditions, then it almost becomes its own constant in the risk/return equation, particularly if those conditions have to do specifically with the behavior of the market.
;-)
So the only people who'd know the predictions being tested would be our government officials. Although I'm sure they'd be declassified over time.
Sad, although I think it would helpful. Too bad the PC crowd got what they wanted crybabying their desires into policy.
Actually, Jay, you pointed out one of the very non-PC problems with this idea: as soon as the predictive power of the market became apparent, allowing the government to put preventive measures in place, this would have to be "priced into" the market. In other words, people would no longer be betting just on the likelihood of a terrorist attack, but also on the probability that if the market agrees with their assessment, then the attack would be prevented. Whatever the morality of valuing money over the lives that would be lost in a terrorist attack, the simple fact is that people would be much less willing to risk money if they could be fairly sure that the government would act to prevent the attacks they were predicting. So really, as soon as the market started working, it would also start to lose its effectiveness. This is true even if money were not involved, since prestige or credibility would simply replace dollars as the currency of the market.
Really, the same is true in the real stock market, which is exactly why people argue for minimal government interference: if people are aware of a party with a disproportionate ability to affect the outcomes of their bets, then they have to factor this knowledge into the decision. If this party's behavior is easily predictable given a certain set of conditions, then it almost becomes its own constant in the risk/return equation, particularly if those conditions have to do specifically with the behavior of the market.