In the following essay, J. Alistair Robinson writes that humanity must prevent letting the spirit of the present age impact its scientific understanding of the world and the things in it.
Whatever your view on the animal-rights movement, Mr. Robinson's article will make you think. It is very much worth a good, close read; and it is fine work. One very much hopes that Mr. Robinson will continue with his writing on the sciences -- and any other issues that may interest him.
-- Tim Machesney
Animal Rights, Anthropomorphism, and Traumatized Fish
by J. Alistair Robinson
MOST OF US ARE OUTRAGED by the violent actions of animal rights extremists, but at the same time the movement’s ideas and assumptions are gaining a foothold in the media and the public imagination. From my own experience, it seems that among the young thinking people of this country, animal rights is a very attractive political and ethical stance. My question is this: how can we be sure that things such as empathy for animals, concern for their moral status, and a desire to put them on a par with humans, do not stem only from a false attribution of uniquely human emotions?
We have a predisposition to see ourselves in the world around us: we endow the universe with human characteristics such as consciousness, and call it God; we hear an expression of love in a cat’s purr; we see an ancient oak as dignified and venerable. This is anthropomorphism. We attribute human characteristics to the things of the world, and those things are independent of that attribution: the fact that we have decided that they have qualities of our own does not make a difference to the actuality of the things themselves. It is, though, natural and important to the way we perceive the world. Unfortunately this means that we often naturally perceive the world falsely, that is, irrationally. Now this is not always a problem (the dawn chorus sounds like joy, and it makes us joyful - so what?), and it is mostly resisted in the areas where it might bias our judgement to dire effect, such as science. But there is an increasing acceptance of anthropomorphism in supposedly rational debates about the differences between humans and animals. And as we shall see, even in some scientific research there is a susceptibility to it.
Leaving aside the arguments about whether or not animals have, or should have, inalienable rights, one persuasive argument for better animal welfare is that the inhumane treatment of animals is uncivilized: that it dehumanizes and brutalizes us. After all, our actions are conscious and chosen, because we are uniquely self-aware and free. We can see that if cruelty repulses us and evokes imaginative emotions and empathy (anthropomorphic as we are) then it might follow that continually straining these responses will desensitize us to cruelty in general, stripping us of our compassion for all beings, including our fellow humans. And this may be true for society as well as for individuals.
Philosopher Daniel Dennett suggests that just as the mistreatment of the dead bodies of our loved ones would be unacceptable to us - despite our knowing that the person has gone - so there may be a similarly good reason to treat animals well, no matter if our empathy and compassion are anthropomorphic. Culture carries with it beliefs and customs that are important to us, and not necessarily because they have obvious practical value or a basis in a true perception of the world.
I do believe that the humane treatment of animals is preferable for these reasons, but we are now seeing anthropomorphism encroach on the part of our society that should be free from it: science. Anthropomorphic conclusions are being presented as additions to our body of knowledge about the world. Some science is now being claimed - often, it seems, by the scientists themselves - to bear out the assumptions of animal rights activists: ‘Does a hook hurt a fish? The evidence is reeling in.’(1)
There are, additionally, more fundamental problems to be tackled when looking deeply into animal rights philosophy. If we decide to give an animal independent moral status, doesn’t that mean that we presuppose it has the capacity to make moral decisions, and ultimately the capacity of consciousness? Can a species be conscious at all if it has not developed language? Some neuroscientists, as well as some modern philosophers, have said that it cannot. And then we have the controversy over the communicative abilities of chimpanzees. I will look briefly at consciousness further on, but here I leave these issues open, and turn to the idea of suffering.
A recent study by a team from the Roslin Institute and the University of Edinburgh concluded that fish feel pain, implying that angling is cruel. Researchers tested the neural responses of rainbow trout and injected the fish with mild poisons. A few incontrovertible statements can be made in the light of the study’s findings: fish have specific neural receptors that respond to heat, mechanical pressure and acid; the neurons fire in a way very similar to the firing patterns of human neurons in response to adverse stimuli; fish behave abnormally when their lips are injected with bee venom and vinegar, rocking from side to side and breathing very rapidly; and the abnormal behaviours and symptoms are not seen - or at least not to the same extent - either in fish that are simply handled or those that are given an injection of a harmless substance.
What are we to conclude from all this? It is truly an addition to our knowledge -it is especially enlightening on the evolutionary divergence of bony fishes and cartilaginous fishes - but can we conclude from it that fish feel pain? To begin with, there is the problem that such a conclusion depends upon a scientific definition of pain, of which there is none. We might define it with reference to the actions of neurons in response to adverse stimuli, but this is only the physiological cause: when we use the word we mean the experience. Even behavioural responses need not be concomitant with an experiential mental state. It seems to me that an adequate definition must take in psychology as well as physiology and behaviour. So it might be that we cannot proceed strictly by deduction from the scientific results to the presence of pain. But why shouldn’t we make a reasonable conclusion based on some other reasonable assumptions? It may seem too obvious to be denied that if another vertebrate species behaves in the same way as we do under a corresponding stimulus, and if its physiological responses to that stimulus are the same as ours, then it feels what we feel. We can see the assumptions being made here more clearly if we consider a definition, given by contemporary philosopher David DeGrazia, of another kind of suffering: anxiety. DeGrazia gives four components to anxiety, all having been observed scientifically in animals:
1. Autonomic hyperactivity (rapid pulse and breathing, sweating, etc.).
2. Motor tension (jumpiness).
3. Inhibition of normal behaviours.
4. Hyperattentiveness (visual scanning, etc.).
These are the symptoms of anxiety that we see in humans. But it might be misleading to group these as a definition of anxiety, because we are accustomed to using the word to signify more than the physiological and behavioural symptoms. When we say anxiety and mean an experience, we cannot omit the thing that allows us to experience in the first place: consciousness of the self existing through time, or temporal self-awareness - the very thing that allows us to be aware of what is happening to us. And DeGrazia does in fact assume this to be the context of the four components, both in humans and in animals. So the definition above, if we are to apply it across the board, asks that we assume what we are trying to prove: that animals experience things in the way that we do.
I now want to present a candidate for the presumed logical argument of all those who claim scientific back-up for the idea that animals experience something akin to human suffering; that fish feel pain or that deer suffer stress. But first I must clear up my meanings. In my argument so far, pain and anxiety are more or less interchangeable. We might also add fear to the list. They are kinds of suffering that have behavioural and physiological symptoms, and that are said by some to be experienced by animals. So to make things simpler, I will use the word suffering. Now, I have cast doubt on certain uses of the words pain and anxiety. Taking this further (perhaps too far), even suffering could be said to apply only to humans. So for convenience I will use it to mean simply the state of a being subjected to adverse stimuli.
For the science to be conclusive on its own, the logic needs to run like this:
1. The nature of both human and nonhuman suffering is in essence physiological and behavioural.
2. The human and nonhuman physiological and behavioural characteristics of
suffering are the same.
3. Therefore, nonhuman suffering is in essence the same as human suffering.
The logic is valid but not necessarily true: Statement 2 is definitely provable but Statement 1 is disputable. It could also be seen as an example of petitio principii reasoning, where the conclusion is taken for granted in a premise, in this case Statement 1.
This is something of a caricature, and I did state earlier that even if a deductive argument doesn’t work, we might still reasonably make conclusions. A fairer representation of the argument might be that the evidence points to the probability of pain and anxiety in animals, if we also accept that many animals are to some extent temporally self-aware, or conscious. Here we can see the same problem cropping up again. Whatever the scientific results tell us, they need to be interpreted in a certain way if they are to lead to: QED, fish feel pain. So the whole question turns on whether it is a reasonable assumption that animals are conscious, something that I cannot cover here in much depth. But crucially we have seen that the cited scientific evidence alone is silent on the question of whether fish feel pain, because it is silent on the question of whether fish are conscious.
Suffering does take on a different quality in a conscious, imaginatively emotional being. As we experience it, it depends upon our sense of ourselves, our sense of the passage of time and of the changing fortunes in our lives. When we are subjected to adverse stimuli we feel pain, anxiety and fear for the very reason that we are conscious of what is happening to us - we experience the stimuli, not only respond unwittingly to them. But because we share so much of our evolutionary history with animals, the outward signs of these responses are similar. We recognize distress in another human being and can be forgiven for attributing the same set of emotions to an animal if we see it behave in the same way.
Even if we are looking only at the science we find disagreement. There is evidence to suggest that fish do not have the capacity to feel pain. Previous studies have found that they do not have an area of the brain corresponding to our own neural pain-processor - the neocortex - so that although the same signals are sent to the brain, there is no recognizable pain-experience-producing region to go to when they arrive. This at least tells us that we cannot describe what it is like to be a suffering fish, because its brain processes the signals in an alien way. How, then, can we make any sort of moral conclusion on this, unless we simply decide - guided by taste, inclination and sentiment - that fish do experience something like human suffering?
Before I conclude, I will touch upon the problem of consciousness, which is probably the crux of the matter. I suggested earlier that a being cannot be conscious without language. Neuroscientists Gerald M. Edelman and Giulio Tononi have written that the concepts of the self and the past and future emerged only when language appeared in the course of evolution, in communities of speakers. There must have been an intimate connection between social development and the evolution of consciousness, and language must be the likeliest contender for that connection.
It has been argued that although we (a) use language and (b) are conscious, (b) need not depend on (a). If it did, the argument goes, babies would not be able to feel pain or experience fear before they developed their language ability. There are two points to be made here. First, it is probably true that new-born babies are not quite conscious. We nurture and protect them while knowing that from the outset they are developing, becoming more and more human. Second, modern cognitive psychology and linguistics tells us that a baby is learning language right from the start.
New-born babies have linguistic skills, because language is partly built-in: it is not just a matter of filling an empty brain with vocabulary and syntax. It seems problematic, then, to back up the claim that language is not necessary for consciousness by comparing animals to babies, which are just humans in development.
But consciousness is another story - a complicated one and the hottest topic for philosophers today - and I must leave it there.
Few of us want to see animals being treated inhumanely, but we would do well to consider how our natural and perhaps inaccurate assumptions about the inner lives of animals can affect our understanding of the true differences between ourselves and other species. Animal rights has more adherents than ever before, and many who profess no passionate beliefs on the subject seem to accept its ideas. The media is currently highly responsive to claims about pain and stress in animals, and science at times is taking anthropomorphism at face-value, and allowing it to bias its conclusions. This could well be to do with the mood of the age, one that happily brings man down a peg or two on the scale of importance at every opportunity. While it is to be welcomed that thanks to science we no longer see ourselves at the centre of the universe as destiny’s chosen creatures, we also need to keep ourselves from allowing the spirit of the times to colour our unique, rational understanding of the world.
Mr. Robinson writes from Edinburgh, Scotland.
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1. Randerson, J. 2003 New Scientist May 15 (Registration required -- Ed.).
It's allways amusing to see these discussions and how its all a result of the evils of high technology.
What I mean is, It's our wounderfull high tech living that gives the luxury of really caring wither or not our food suffers. Instead of whorring about how to get it to stop struggling to get away and what not.
It seems simple enough to try and treat animals with as much mercy resonably can and leve it at that. We shouldn't concern ourselves to much with theri suffering, especialy if its a food animal.
If you look at agriculture historically, animals were used as food and beasts of burden, but they were never tortured -- who would benefit from that? I buy free-range meats where the animals have been fed appropriate food -- not the ground-up pieces of their compatriots. I love meat, and I don't plan to stop eating meat, but I prefer meat that's been raised and butchered as well as possible. That means we pay extra, but it's worth it.
I'm not so concerned with the suffering of the animals (I'm a human-first kind of guy, and there's plenty of human suffering to deal with) as I am with the cleanliness of the facilities and the health impact eating Big Meat can have on people. The book "Fast Food Nation" goes into a lot of detail about how corporate mergers and centralized processing of meat can have a negative impact on consumers, employees and yes, animals.
As one who likes to play the Devil's Advocate, I would ask, where do animal rights come from? The Declaration of Independence says that human rights come from God. Do the animal rights activists make the same claim?
As an aside, I wonder how many animal rights activists are concerned about partial birth abortion.
In my view, you have to go out of your way to be cruel to animals for it to be cruel - ie, it must be a specific effort to inflict pain for no other purpose than the joy of inflicting pain (pulling the wings off flies, lighting a cat's tail on fire - that sort of thing). If it doesn't rise to this level, then its simply not cruelty in my mind. Industrial meat production is just a more efficient means of producing meat..there is no cruelty involved because the intent is not to be cruel, but to raise food more cheaply for human consumption; also, human needs trump animal needs all the time and everywhere.
Perhaps in the agricultural area there was not mistreatment of animals. I'd have to do some research before I could make a conclusion on that.
On the cultural level, however, there are certainly instances of animal mistreatment in history. Isn't beating the "scapegoat" (a goat carrying the misdeeds of the town) until it leaves the city limits unnecessary cruelty?
As one who was raised on a Dairy farm, I would say we treated our animals humanely. The goal of a dairy farmer is to get as much milk from a cow as possible. Towards that end, you do what you think will give the highest milk production. That usually involves treating the cows very humanely. Cows under a lot of stress don't produce a lot of milk. But that was many years ago. I cannot speak to other agricultural businesses or today's practices.
there is no cruelty involved because the intent is not to be cruel
That's silly. If you're running a child-labour sweatshop and you whip the kids to increase their productivity, of course you're being cruel. Now you could say that the reasoning doesn't apply to animals because, well, they're animals - but it has nothing to do with why you're being cruel - whether its for productivity or sadism, cruelty is cruelty.
Mark "Industrial meat production is just a more efficient means of producing meat..there is no cruelty involved because the intent is not to be cruel, but to raise food more cheaply for human consumption; also, human needs trump animal needs all the time and everywhere."
The key is the word NEED. Do humans really need to consume as much meat as we do...or do we just LIKE to. If we don't really need it, then isn't it cruel?
Bracketing entirely the question of my agreement or disagreement with Mr. Robinson, this is an excellent piece— writing and thinking of a very high caliber.
I would adopt a rather different perspective on the value and function of anthropomorphism in human knowing— at least, in some areas of human life which we might classify as "vitally important topics"— but that's the influence on me of Peircean pragmaticism. Unfortunately, I'm in the middle of a very busy day, so I'll have to leave it at that.
Once again, excellent piece!
Max,
Humans and animals are different entities...you can whip a horse to encourage it to greater effort without being cruel, but to whip a human being thusly is cruel...get it? Animals and humans aren't the same - you can do things to animals (ie, brain them, slice them up and then cook them) which you can't do to humans.
Patrick,
You might as well ask if we need to consume as much oil as we consume. We certainly need to consume some meat and some oil, but its impossible to know precisely when we cross over from "need" to "want"; meat, however, is a needed commodity no matter how you slice it and if a company works out a way to produce a lot more of it more cheaply then before, then its still attempting to meet a human need, even if the result is that there's now enough beef for steaks to be cheap enough for everyone to eat, even when it stands to reason that everyone doesn't need a steak today.
Wow! That's a lot of research and a lot of writing to not come to a conclusion about whether animals feel pain.
Here's a simpler experiment. You can do it home, although I recommend against it - It's actually too cruel.
Close a door on your cat's tail. Note it's reaction. When I did it (accidentally, of course) my cat howled like I'd never heard it howl before or after. I once got a finger slammed in a door. My reaction was extremely similar. I howled. The only time I ever howled like it was in extreme pain. The only time I heard my cat howl was in a situation in which, had I taken it's place, I would have suffered extreme pain and howled too.
Conclusion - cats feel pain. Cats are animals, so at least one other animal experiences pain.
And by the way, I didn't make a consious decision to howl. It was strictley reflexive. Therefore, I also conclude that consiousness is not a prerequisite to experience pain.
So by your logic, Mark, there is no human want that can't be justified with respect to animal cruelty...correct? I just don't see the major difference between humans and the other higher chordates that would justify this outlook. Brains, nervous systems, emotions, family relations, (limited) cognitive skills...what precisely are they lacking that makes their suffering unimportant.
Also, I do ask the same question re: petroleum consumption...and I'm a little surprised that you seem to condsider it pointless. Just because we can't know precisely how much is enough doesn't mean the question shouldn't be considered.
Patrick,
Pretty much - what happens to non-human things in this world is, in my view, driven entirely by the needs of humanity.
It is due to wise stewardship that we preserve species and habitat...for our own purposes, not for the non-existent intrinsic value of the plants and animals of the natural world. You see, eventually the whole world dies - you can't preserve things forever, if thats your goal...our task, as the sentient beings of the planet, is to manage things for our own long-term benefit...but "long term" doesn't mean forever, because when "forever" comes, anything we saved will just go to waste.
So, yes, there is nothing you can do to an animal which is cruel if it accrues to the net benefit of human beings.
Patrick,
Oh, and the reason we can't get into considering how much of any particular thing we need is because then we get into setting artificial, and destructive, limits on what humans can do. If you crunch the numbers and say that we can use 1 million barrels of oil a day, then you cut-off the possibility of a gigantic benefit being created by the use of 10,000 more barrels than the one million you've allotted as our "need".
Restrictions on what we use must be based upon our needs - ie, we need a great deal of natural habitat out there to ensure our own survival...so, there are X zillions of items which are possible to be used to satisfy our needs which we will not use....but we don't say that we'll only use a particular amount over a set period of time because that prevents people from actually making modifications due to changing conditions (ie, if we are using oil "too fast" then the price will go up and alternate materials and methods will be developed...methods and materials which may be massively better than the oil we were using "too fast" and which we would not have developed without the impetus of growing scarcity of oil).
Why would someone start out an article about animal rights with a bald statement that God doesn't exist and is a mistake?
There are arguments to be made about animal rights, but basing your argument in atheism seems rather groundless.
I guess I'm rather with you, ctl.
From a Christian perspective one can argue we are to be good stewards and thus imply humane treatment of animals. However, if one takes an atheist point of view, I see no objectively based argument for animal rights. I only see survival of the fittest and nothing to compel us to be better.
Mr. Robinson is so wrong 'wrong' is barely adequate to cover how wrong he is.
We are animals. We are chordates, vertebrates, tetrapods, synapsids, therapsids, mammals, primates, apes, hominids, humans. We got our innards, our skeletons, our brains from out non-human ancestors. Even our vaunted neo-cortex is prefigured in the brains of pre Homo sapien predecessors.
Here's a wack from the clue stick for Mr. Robinson, emotions and sensations are processed in the amygdala, not the neo-cortex. Our assesment of emotions and sensation is done using the neo-cortex, but that is not where they are felt.
Other animals are as capable of feeling emotions as we are. Just because they can't express themselves as we do does not mean they can't feel as we do.
As for sentience. All our tests for sentience are designed with humans in mind. We can recognize ourselves in a mirror. A cat cannot. Does that mean the cat is not sentient? No, it doesn't. All it means is the cat cannot recognize his image in a mirror.
An image, I must add, that doesn't smell like him. How can it be him if it doesn't smell like him?
In my considered opinion a better test of sentience lies in the answer to the question: Does the animal get bored? Proposition: Only an animal that gets bored when there's nothing to do is sentient. Cats get bored, dogs get bored, orang utangs get bored, and find ways to escape from the zoo enclosure so they can go wandering around the facilities seeing what's there. These are sentient animals.
But, they're not as sapient, not as capable of reasoning as the typical human. They are not our peers. They cannot be treated as our peers. Nor can they be treated as human, for a non-human cannot deal with the world as we do. They are the product of a different evolutionary path than the one our ancestors took. A dog cannot understand equality. His is a structured, stratified world. Is canine society there must be superior and inferior. Any other way leads to upset, confusion, and stress.
Mr. Robinson and his like are holdovers from the time we saw ourselves as unique, apart from the natural world. We know that to be false these days, we know we are part of the natural world and that much we reserved to ourselves also belongs to the other animals. But some hold on to the old view because they won't admit they are nothing special. Not in the ways they think they should be special.
Besides which, Mr. Robinson has such a warped perception of what anthropomorphism involves. It is the attribution of human motivations, human ways of perceiving and dealing with the world to non-humans. A gorilla perceives and deals with the world in a much different way than we do. He understands his world in a way we don't, a more limited way since his ability to comprehend is less than ours. Which affects how he deals with the world. The same hold true for other species.
So Mr. Robinson holds to an outdated, disproven view of the world we live in, and so is led to expose his prejudices and bigotries in ill thought, ill composed expositions. One day his views will be seen as scientific as a young Earth creationist, and given as much credence in the scientific world.
If rhinos don't feel emotion, then why do they bond with their keepers?
Alan,
I'm not quite sure where you stand on the issue in question - ie, do animals have rights?
Alan:
Mr. Robinson is so wrong 'wrong' is barely adequate to cover how wrong he is.
Strong words for such a weak argument.
We are animals.
After which follows a whole list of adjectives showing just how different we are from the slugs, fish, dogs, and monkeys. Yet, we are so much alike, the slugs and we.
Plato aside, "animal" is a grouping we impose on the variety of phenomena we call "living things" (another grouping of like type). Which is to say that "animals" are defined by how they are like each other in ways that, say, "plants" are not.
We could decide that animals feel pain, or we could decide that this is one of the things humans can do that other animals cannot. But to assert that indeed, humans are animals, and therefore animals must feel pain is just as much nonsense as asserting that indeed, the Cubs play in Chicago, so Chicagoans must all hit like Sammy Sosa.
All our tests for sentience are designed with humans in mind.
No; all our tests for sentience are designed with language in mind. It's worth discussing why this is, but keep in mind that we do this because we have no decent alternative, which goes a long way to bolstering the argument that sentience is defined by its ability to communicate.
In my considered opinion a better test of sentience lies in the answer to the question: Does the animal get bored?
I'm afraid I'm going to have to ask you for more proof than that. Many creatures exhibit pain that do not exhibit behavior consistent with "boredom".
Which itself provides another objection. Why must animals act like bored humans to be officially classified as "bored"? If a fish were bored, how would you know?
But, they're not as sapient, not as capable of reasoning as the typical human.
Wait! I thought we were all animals! That means we're all alike, right?
Mr. Robinson and his like are holdovers from the time we saw ourselves as unique, apart from the natural world.
Yes; in those dark days, we thought of animals as "the product of a different evolutionary path than the one our ancestors took". It's such a good thing you think differently now, isn't it?
I think I'll stop now. Alan, your rant defies classification. It's almost as if you're arguing circularly and disproving your own premises at the same time.
Fundamentally, I think your main error is that you simultaneously assert that we are different from animals (because you must; it is too obvious to deny) and yet want to assert that we are the same. That's fair; we are the same in many observable ways, and different in others. But the existence of similarities and differences means that we cannot assume any single similarity or difference; all must be proven or disproven, or we must admit our ignorance. Anything else is foolishness.
It is also foolishness to ridicule the writings of others when you have so little to say yourself.
Doug:
Here's a simpler experiment.
And how is this different from the experiment done by the Roslin Institute and the University of Edinburgh, besides being less scientifically rigorous and involving a cat instead of several fish?
You did read the article's treatment of this evidence, right? What response do you have to that?
One of the points made by Alan Kellog that should be taken seriously is his assertion that emotions and sensations are processed in the amygdala, not the neo-cortex. Our assesment of emotions and sensation is done using the neo-cortex, but that is not where they are felt.
This is an interesting point. It reminds me (and I often need to be reminded) not to simplify the incredible complexity of the brain. In John Brockman's talk with Joseph LeDoux - Parallel Memories: Putting Emotions Back Into The Brain - the latter states:
...the amygdala turned out to be a necessary and sufficient link between the auditory system and the autonomic nervous system. However, in a more general sense, the amygdala is the link between all sensory systems and all fear responses systems.
The conversation in general highlights the difficulty in talking about emotions: we cannot even agree on a definition. It is certainly true that our emotions have biological-evolutionary roots in common with nonhuman animals, but this is not the issue. If you want to describe nociception and its related responses as emotion then that's fine - just make sure you tell us exactly what you mean.
And the fact that different systems of the brain are going to be involved in the different kinds of emotions suggests that in evolutionary terms human emotions, with developing consciousness, had the neural potential to become something quite different from the corresponding nonhuman responses.
LeDoux's use of feelings has to be read in context, but his following statement suggests that what he calls the emotion systems - which include the amygdala - are separate from pleasant or unpleasant experience:
emotion systems, like the fear system, didn't come about to create feelings (like the feeling of being afraid when in danger)
Also:
...animals were unconscious, unfeeling, and non-linguistic before they were conscious, feeling, and linguistic. It's too bad that we define the more basic processes as the negation processes that typify the human brain. It's possible that once consciousness and feelings came along that new kinds of emotions specifically tied to these evolved.
My article disputes none of this.
I know it can be annoying to give lots of links, but the work of James D. Rose can't be ignored, so for anyone who's truly interested:
http://www.cotrout.org/do_fish_feel_pain.htm
www.eaa-europe.org/2003/PFCasework/ FishPain-Rebuttal-JamesRose-EN.htm
Paul,
thanks for the nice comments!
Alan:
Sorry about misspelling your name.
Mark: You believe that "there is nothing you can do to an animal which is cruel if it accrues to the net benefit of human beings," but you didn't answer my question- what is so different about us and them (higher chordates at least) that gives you this belief? How are we so much better as to justify this.
And as for the petroleum/consumption question...I never suggested setting limits on consumption. Merely that we should make conscious condsideration of the effects of our consumption when we evaluate the difference between want and need. I don't advocate government restrictions on personal consumption, but I do think we should advocate as a society a greater condsideration for our impact.
Patrick,
What is different between humans and animals? Humans are moral creatures - capable of turning from good to evil and back again based entirely upon choice. Animals just do what they're hard-wired to do. There is no actual evil or good in them. While some animals have more brain-power than others, it still remains even for the higher primates that they do what they are genetically inclined to do. Human beings also have a lot of genetic impulses - but as can, if we wish, entirely ignore them...we don't have to breed, don't have to eat, etc.
For the believers, like me, this was all ordained by God - the world was given to us to use wisely for our own benefit. But even for non-believers, it still works out just like that - because the world will not last forever, its pointless to try and preserve things forever; its all going to go, so the only question is how to use it so that it lasts as long as we do.
I have a pet dog - I am nice to this doggy; I feed him, scratch him behind the ears and play fetch with him. It pleases me - and the dog eats his food, eagerly submits to ear-scratching and is usually the one bringing me the ball for a bit of fetch. Much as I like this dog, his importance in the scale of things is rather small. He's an eccentricty of the human condition - caring for and feeding something which does not accrue any net gain to the human species. But in the end, he would be sacrificed long before I'd even consider discomforting myself.
I guess I'm kind of in the middle on this issue. At one extreme would be those who would maintain that animals have _zero_ rights, which would mean, e.g., that setting fire to a dog is no worse than setting fire to a cardboard box. No one here is advocating that position and we have laws against the sort of despicable creeps who would do such a thing, both to protect the dog and also because such creeps would have no compunctions about setting fire to a human being if they could get away with it.
But, while I adore cats and I would punch anyone who intentionally slammed a door on a cat's tail, I would also have no compuctions about feeding slain fish to a cat. There is a hierarchy, a food chain, and we are at the top of it, whether by evolution or by creation, and I intend to stay on top. Animals may have rights but they do not have _equal_ rights. I don't believe humans are equal except before the law, much less other species. The mere fact that we can debate about our relations to other species shows that there is something different about the human mind. Other animals have no such debates.
I oppose the radical element within the animal rights movement who say (and this is an actual quote, meant seriously) "a rat is a pig is a dog is a boy". Back in my day, it was the liberals who pushed for programs to protect poor children in the slums from being bitten by rats. Today, the radicals defend the rats. Many of these radicals in PETA and such argue that keeping animals as pets is immoral. Ironic, because it was precisely by making pets out of animals that we humans leaned to love them and treat them humanely. I submit that these radical egalitarians are not so interested in humane treatment of animals as they are in denying human dignity and in levelling and destroying civilization.
I must add: A human being can never be "merely an animal". We either rise above or sink below the rest of creation. No other animal could have built the World Trade Center, or thought of doing so. No other animal could have destroyed it, or thought of doing so.
Steven,
Just wanted to compliment you on your last bit - that is sublime.
First, I would disagree with the proposition that humans are different from animal because we are moral/immoral and they are only hardwired. Doesn't society train people to behave in moral fashion? And can't I train a chimp to act in a moral fashion? How do you define 'moral' behavior for that matter? Protect your friends...eat only what you kill...sex only for procreation- so far thats the family pooch.
But even if I presume your right, this opens two other questions:
First, what if the person in question is not (yet) capable of morality. Can we poke babies with sharp sticks? What about retards?
Secondly (and more importantly) since our morality is what (supposedly) seperates us from the animals, doesn't that capability for morality also come with certian responsiblities? Mainly, the wise and thoughtful use of our resources? You stated above "...there is nothing you can do to an animal which is cruel if it accrues to the net benefit of human beings." How do you measure this 'net benefit'? If I enjoy shooting wild ponies, through the neck for target practice, am I accruing a benefit? No doubt my aim will be improving, and it might be fun...but don't you find it immoral to cause so much pain for such a trivial benefit?
Mark:
Thank you.
Mr. Licquia, do you practice stupidity, or does it come natural to you?
We are animals. We come from a long line animals. We have much in common with other animals, and we are unique in other ways. The same holds true of any other species.
Now tell me, where did I say we're are the same as other animals? We have much in common with other species, and much that is different. We share ribs with fish, and have a unique hip joint. We have lungs much like those of dogs, and a larynx capable of the wide range of sounds a speaking animal needs. Simply because we share some traits with other species does not make us the same as they.
Besides which, just because a species lacks an ability we have -language for example- does not mean they lack another. Being unable to express itself as a human does does not mean a horse is incapable of feeling emotion.
Try thinking before you reply to a comment, your brain could surprise you.
Patrick,
I guess the way to put it is that we are capable of moral choice, but this does not mean we'll always exercise this faculty. Think in terms of the man who chooses to risk himself in the flames to rescue another person, and the man who stands there too shocked to move - both are humans, both are capable of making a moral choice, but only one of them did. Meanwhile, a dog would not (except when conditioned by humans to do so) jump into the flames to rescue anything other than, perhaps, her pups.
As for other human beings; once again, our ability to make moral choices comes into play. I saw a documentary a few days ago where a mare fiercely defended her lame colt...for a while, and then she went away and allowed it to be trampled to death - the hard-wire urged her to defense, but not at the risk of herself (this making sense biologically - a living mare can have other colts, a dead mare and colt accrues no benefit to the species). We humans, save for the mentally disturbed among us, would defend the helpless child and ensure, even at the risk of our own lives, that it was allowed to live. The child, of course, cannot make the moral choice - but as a human child, it retains the potentiality for doing so, and thus is amazingly valuable in the scale of things; worth a great deal of trouble to preserve.
You can train a chimp to ape human actions, but this is not the same as instructing a human being in right conduct. Using a series of rewards and punishments, you can get a lot of the higher animals to do all sorts of things; but a human being, no matter how sternly instructed by his elders, retains the ability to utterly reject the instruction - to impose knew instructions upon the self and act upon them.
And, finally, sheer self-interest dictates that we preserve and protect the environment - but, once again, this is done for our benefit, not for the benefit of the environment as an entity, or animals and plants as things.
I must ask this first. Why is it those targeted in a 'rant' can be so civil, but it's those on the periphery that get irate?
Anyway; Mr. Robinson, after seeing my name misspelled so often by so many people I don't bother getting irate over it. I send a gentle correction, and if they won't get the hint I perform a Satanic ritual consigning their moronic souls to Hell and ignore them as the damned fools they are.:)
As to other species feeling or not feeling emotions as we do. I'd say it depends. Depends on how 'advanced' the animal is intellectually. Humans have the unique ability to communicate their feelings and emotions. Other species do not. Not as we do. I submit, sir, that that is the main difference between us and other species. Not in whether or not other animals feel or don't feel emotions.
It's an unnecessary difference. We already have enough to distinguish us from other animals, we don't need this.
Another commenter asked if I believe (non-human) animals have rights. Not as such. They are, after all, non-human. Even if they could understand what we mean by rights, what we consider rights may be so alien to their way of thought those rights may have on applicability to them.
Should we provide a good life for those animals under our care? Of course. Even if we intend to eat the specimen or use it in some other way.
We are, after all, omnivores, and require meat in our diet along with the vegetables and fruit. There is a middle ground between objectifying lunch and romanticising the lumbering beast.
Besides, I don't see death as a horrible thing. When you croak you'll find out why. If a sheep must die so I can live, then the sheep dies. Call me self-centered, but in my world I and my fellow humans come first.
That's my take on the matter, dogs know joy, cats know love, and tasmanian devils get separation anxiety. (Ever watch a mother taz chase off a mostly grown child? The poor youngin' is miserable. Tazzies are also know to bond with their keepers. Could see them as surrogate mommies.)
To paraphrase an old saying, a difference that is no difference is no difference.
Mark, even caring for the environment for our own purposes means benefits for non-humans, when we do it right.
Besides, we need a healthy environment if we are to stay healthy ourselves. We are a part of this world, not something separate. As our world fares so do we.
Remember, arsenic kills people as well as rats.
Mark,
As I said, I won't quibble about where morality comes from, or even what specifically it is...since I'm sure we disagree and I'm equally sure we won't convice each other to change...
But you still haven't answered the most important question: If it is our morality (or potential for morality) that seperates us from the animals, then doesn't that higher potential also come with a higher responsibility? After all, what is the point of having the potential for morality if you don't USE it? It seems to me that inflicting pain on helpless creatures for trivial human gain is in and of itself immoral.
Also-
"For the believers, like me, this was all ordained by God - the world was given to us to use wisely for our own benefit."
Many 'believers' (Jews, Muslims, and some Christians, I believe) interpret this wise use to include avoiding unnecessary cruelty.
Patrick,
Unnecessary cruelty, by definition, does not accrue any benefit to humans, thus its not allowed - whether or not the cruelty is being visted upon humans, animals, or the environment in general. But its cruel, without a doubt, to butcher a cow and eat it....cruel to the cow, useful to human beings, and therefore allowable.
And, yes, our existence as moral beings enjoins upon us an extra responsibility; an animal merely has to do what is has to do, while we have things we must do, even if not compelled by biology to do them.
Now you are equivocating. First you said any human want is justified...now it is only if it accrues a benefit. Who determines whether or not the benefit is sufficient? You? The Feds? God?
Precisely how much human profit makes dog-fighting legit? How about seal-clubbing?
I'm know I'm being argumentative, but I'm trying to make the point that intent to cause cruelty is should not be the only concern. The amount of benefit must also be questioned.