Well, if you were going to do away with some part of the military rank structure, I'd suggest just eliminating everything above the W-5 paygrade.

In my view, today's military is too top heavy and is filled with junior leaders -- the E-4's, E-5's and E-6's -- who rather than seize their leadership duties (and the attendant respect those duties confer) expect those duties to be handed to them.

What I mean by that is that as leaders go through the ranks, they typically rather than let go of the duties and responsibilities they had at their previous rank try to do both what was expected of them at the old rank and what is expected of them at their new rank. What they are supposed to do is let their imminent successors in the next lower rank tier handle the things they handled at that rank. It takes awhile to pry those duties out of the clutches of the newly promoted dutybound servicemember and the result is that there is an erosion of responsibility going from the junior ranks to the senior ranks.

In plain terms, I remember watching an Army E-7 in Mogadishu on a tent alignment detail (because tents, like everything else, have their perfect place in the military universe) with a rifle slung over his shoulder. Three things struck me about this scene: a) there is no way in hell my father would have ever been caught on a tent alignment detail as an Army Sergenat First Class; b) there was no way in hell a Marine Corps Gunnery Sergeant (same paygrade) of that day would be caught on a tent alignment working party; c) there is no way in hell a Marine Corps Gunnery Sergeant would be caught with an M-16 unless he was about to shoot someone/thing.

The Army has (or rather 'had' while I was in the Corps, maybe it's gotten better) an advanced case of this erosion of responsibility. The Marine Corps not so much, but it was still there. In 1995, I had a major problem-filled project dropped in my lap by my Captain. At the time, I was a lowly Corporal/E-4. As I went from place to place and office to office to resolve the issues associated with the project, I heard time and time again that what I was doing was not work for a Corporal, but rather for someone with a few more stripes, like a Gunnery or Master Sergeant. I found this pervasive opinion proof of that erosion. I wound up accomplishing the mission, although not terribly well. This in the end did not bother me, as I knew that the reason Captain Kelleher gave me the assignment was because neither he, nor his senior enlisted staff could accomplish the mission even as well as I had, and had I failed, the failure would have had a lot less stigma attached to our office because I was merely a Corporal.

I disagree with Chad for reasons too complicated to get into here. I agree with your basic premise Dean and in fact am working on a paper with that essential theme, which I'm presenting in Chicago next month.

One of the main reasons the U.S. Army functions so efficiently is the fact that we have HIGHLY trained professional at all ranks and they are HIGHLY specialized in their particular fields. For the most part, officers define the concept of operations and ensure that the proper equipment is available to accomplish the mission. It is the mid to senior grade NCO that makes sure the mission is accomplish by training and leading his/her soldiers, but it is the soldier that gets the job done. Keep in mind this, ultimately, the responsibility of overall mission success is the commissioned officer. It's his ass on the line.

Nonproductive adversity happens when either of the key leaders (officers or NCOs) are incompetent or a lack of trust and teamwork exist. In my 13 years of current Army service (I am a SFC/E-7), healthy competition and ribbing between officers and enlisted result in a team that works effectively together. Obviously, officers (and NCOs) that attempt to further their careers at the expense of others and the mission are a detriment to the military. While these types of leaders are not the norm, they do exist and stand out in my mind rather profoundly.

As a senior leader, I have to trust my superiors to make the right decisions, but be prepared to carry out orders even when they make poor decisions. Most good leaders consult their experienced subordinate leaders and ask for their input prior to any important mission.

Glory seekers, micro-managers, and cruel, power hungry leaders degrade our military, and unfortunately continue to hold command in some units. Luckily, 99% of the soldiers in those units realize that a jackass is running the show for now, but not for long.

Military life is not for everyone. You've got to be willing NOT to question every asinine order given (one must follow lawful orders even if they are stupid), and motivate your soldiers to "suck it up" when things get tough. Overall, my experience has been positive, and I wouldn't change a thing except for the fact that I would have liked to spend more time with my family...there's always retirement.

Tim the Soldier

The NCOs and COs have different functional responsibilities. Radically different ones. As a for instance, an army NCO doesn't start learning the "NCO's creed" until their bucking for E-4 which is not even really so much about leadership as augmenting the CO and helping direct his peers. By the time somebody is an O-4 their on their second rotation of schools on leadership.

Essentially, it's the same difference you see in a company where they have a management track distinct from the managerial track. The NCO's are more closely aligned to the technical track, while the COs are more or less equivalent to a managerial track.

A thing to keep in mind (that a lot of 1 and 2 LTs forget) is to look at it in terms of years of service. A guy who is an E-7 has been around the track a couple of times. A fresh 2LT that's just fallen off the turnip truck still has rank, but that's (in theory at least) an administrative convienence to designate the flow of direction from higher ranks and a designation on who has the ultimate responsibility for getting things done. It's kind of like rolling into middle management 'cuz you just got an MBA and listening to your office manager, your accounts manager, etc who all have a decade's experience.

Now whether there is merit or not in eliminating the distinction between the two, it was my impression that the difference between NCOs and COs is a bit bigger than simply who gets hit last when then sh!t rolls down hill.

Manager vs. Managerial track?

Did you mean Managerial vs. Technical, or something?

He does. And that would have been my point as well, had A.R. not beaten me to it.

When I was younger, I used to rail against what I thought was an antiquated medieval system from the days when officers were merely landowners given some form of rank and the enlisted were their peasants who forced to fight for their lords. I used to think that it was ridiculous way to run things in a democracy, considering that most officers were nothing more than guys with a liberal arts degree and a few weeks of OTS, but again, most NCO's I knew had as much, if not more education than those given a commission. But I think the distinction between officer and enlisted is necessary and invaluable.

In every organization, you need a managerial corps and a technical corps. I'm not too familiar with the civilian world, but from what I understand, a person can realistically move from the bottom to the managerial ranks if he has the motivation, knowledge and political saavy to do so. That happens every so often in the military with enlisteds moving into the officer ranks, but it's not too commonplace and a person can only make that move before he hits a certain point in his career.

Let me put it this way: Take two guys, Amn Snuffy and Lt Wonderboy. As 1's, their lives aren't too different. They're both learning the ropes, bit from the outset, Lt Wonderboy's focus is totally different than Snuffy's. Snuffy is trying to figure out how to do a specific job, has no responsibility and is only accountable for his own personal actions. Wonderboy is being taught how to lead and manage in addition to learning his career field. He's responsible and accountable for a few other people besides himself and is expected to meet a higher standard than Snuffy.

By the time both hit 4, Wonderboy has already assumed command of units and has hit field-grade level. His level of responsibility and accountability is enormous compared to Snuffy, who has just now entered the NCO ranks and is getting his first taste of formal leadership training. Snuffy's an expert in his job and has probably been responsible for a small group of people, but he's still only expected to be proficient in his career field and gain knowledge that helps him do his specific job better. By O-4, Wonderboy is an experienced leader and manager and will assume ever increasing levels of responsibility as his focus shifts from career-field specific responsibility to general leadership and other big picture areas. He'll start attending War Colleges, seminars and other training of that sort. If Snuffy wants to become an officer, he has to do it as an E-4 or E-5, because his career track will take him in a far different direction than Wonderboy's as he increases in grade. Even then, his chances at hitting anything above O-4 are remote, as he will be playing catch-up and dealing with the institutional bias against former enlisted people.

If Snuffy stays enlisted, he'll recieve leadership training, but it will be smaller in scope than that of Snuffy, who will eventually take command of Squadrons, Groups and eventually Wings. Snuffy will achieve leadership positions in his own flight, but he will still be limited to his career field and his scope will be far smaller. He has leadership training and ability, but it's of a far different breed than Wonderboy's. Snuffy's task as an E-7 or E-8 will be to get the flight under him to do what those above have directed. As an O-7 or O-8, Wonderboy is doing war planning, forming strategies and other "vision" things. He's not concerned with the day-to-day running of the organization. He's the one pointing his finger in a certain direction while others under his command are responsible for insuring that everyone gets to where Wonderboy wants them to go. What Snuffy's doing as an E-7 or E-8, Wonderboy was doing as an O-1 through O-3.

So Snuffy has certain managerial skills, but should he become an officer? As Yoda says, he's "too old to begin the training." Sure, he can advance to O-1, but what would be the point? As a senior enlisted, Snuffy enjoys a special place within the enlisted force structure and to become an O-1 would be a step down for him and also fairly demeening. He'd be making more money, but it would be impractical for social and professional reasons. He could never hope to advance very far in the officer grades, due to age and other factors. It just wouldn't be right.

So you still need a well-defined distinction between the enlisted force and the officer corps. The enlisted force develops its own people for their own unique needs: mostly the development of technical skills followed with ever increasing levels of responsibility with a definite scope. Officers from the outset are tasked with both job knowledge and leadership tasks. As they advance, the ratio of management to techincal job knowledge starts to tilt ever faster toward leadership until they reach a point to where they bear a burden of responsibility, accountability and general knowledge unknown to senior enlisted. It's better to have one half of the force concentrate on technical skills and leadership within those skills while the other half focuses more on management and leadership in general, instead of mixing the two willy-nilly.

Besides, it's worked well that way for hundreds of years. If it ain't broke, don't fix it.

Sgt. Stryker:
Please note that your analysis -while quite accurate during peacetime- goes out the window during a real war of any duration. Then you'll see a fair number of battlefield promotions. The problem is that all the training you mention still doesn't prepare someone for war; we just hope it does. Even generals aren't ready most of the time...

I will agree with your summation: NCOs and officers are different animals.

Would you say there is much of a difference between the actual combat arms, and those who can expect to (generally) not enter combat?

Also, I'm curious to hear your reaction to the news that the new Chief of Staff of the Army will be General Peter Schoomaker, considering that he's the former head of SOCOM?

http://www.strategypage.com/fyeo/howtomakewar/default.asp?target=HTLEAD.HTM

If this doesn't draw the picture... :)

THE 'EATHEN

Rudyard Kipling

The 'eathen in 'is blindness bows down to wood an' stone;
'E don't obey no orders unless they is 'is own;
'E keeps 'is side-arms awful: 'e leaves 'em all about,
An' then comes up the regiment an' pokes the 'eathen out.

All along o' dirtiness, all along o' mess,
All along o' doin' things rather-more-or-less,
All along of abby-nay, kul, an' hazar-ho, *
Mind you keep your rifle an' yourself jus' so!

The young recruit is 'aughty -- 'e draf's from Gawd knows where;
They bid 'im show 'is stockin's an' lay 'is mattress square;
'E calls it bloomin' nonsense -- 'e doesn't know no more --
An' then up comes 'is Company an' kicks 'im round the floor!

The young recruit is 'ammered -- 'e takes it very 'ard;
'E 'angs 'is 'ead an' mutters -- 'e sulks about the yard;
'E talks o' "cruel tyrants" 'e'll swing for by-an'-by,
An' the others 'ears an' mocks 'im, an' the boy goes orf to cry.

The young recruit is silly -- 'e thinks o' suicide;
'E's lost 'is gutter-devil; 'e 'asn't got 'is pride;
But day by day they kicks 'im, which 'elps 'im on a bit,
Till 'e finds 'isself one mornin' with a full an' proper kit.

Gettin' clear o' dirtiness, gettin' done with mess,
Gettin' shut o' doin' things rather-more-or-less;
Not so fond of abby-nay, kul, nor hazar-ho,
Learns to keep 'is rifle an' 'isself jus' so!

The young recruit is 'appy -- 'e throws a chest to suit;
You see 'im grow mustaches; you 'ear 'im slap 'is boot;
'E learns to drop the "bloodies" from every word 'e slings,
An' 'e shows an 'ealthy brisket when 'e strips for bars an' rings.

The cruel-tyrant-sergeants they watch 'im 'arf a year;
They watch 'im with 'is comrades, they watch 'im with 'is beer;
They watch 'im with the women at the regimental dance,
And the cruel-tyrant-sergeants send 'is name along for "Lance".

An' now 'e's 'arf o' nothin', an' all a private yet,
'Is room they up an' rags 'im to see what they will get;
They rags 'im low an' cunnin', each dirty trick they can,
But 'e learns to sweat 'is temper an' 'e learns to sweat 'is man.

An', last, a Colour-Sergeant, as such to be obeyed,
'E schools 'is men at cricket, 'e tells 'em on parade;
They sees 'em quick an' 'andy, uncommon set an' smart,
An' so 'e talks to orficers which 'ave the Core at 'eart.

'E learns to do 'is watchin' without it showin' plain;
'E learns to save a dummy, an' shove 'im straight again;
'E learns to check a ranker that's buyin' leave to shirk;
An' 'e learns to make men like 'im so they'll learn to like their work.

An' when it comes to marchin' he'll see their socks are right,
An' when it comes to action 'e shows 'em 'ow to sight;
'E knows their ways of thinkin' and just what's in their mind;
'E knows when they are takin' on an' when they've fell be'ind.

'E knows each talkin' corpril that leads a squad astray;
'E feels 'is innards 'eavin', 'is bowels givin' way;
'E sees the blue-white faces all tryin' 'ard to grin,
An' 'e stands an' waits an' suffers till it's time to cap 'em in.

An' now the hugly bullets come peckin' through the dust,
An' no one wants to face 'em, but every beggar must;
So, like a man in irons which isn't glad to go,
They moves 'em off by companies uncommon stiff an' slow.

Of all 'is five years' schoolin' they don't remember much
Excep' the not retreatin', the step an' keepin' touch.
It looks like teachin' wasted when they duck an' spread an' 'op,
But if 'e 'adn't learned 'em they'd be all about the shop!

An' now it's "'Oo goes backward?" an' now it's "'Oo comes on?"
And now it's "Get the doolies," an' now the captain's gone;
An' now it's bloody murder, but all the while they 'ear
'Is voice, the same as barrick drill, a-shepherdin' the rear.

'E's just as sick as they are, 'is 'eart is like to split,
But 'e works 'em, works 'em, works 'em till he feels 'em take the bit;
The rest is 'oldin' steady till the watchful bugles play,
An' 'e lifts 'em, lifts 'em, lifts 'em through the charge that wins the day!

The 'eathen in 'is blindness bows down to wood an' stone;
'E don't obey no orders unless they is 'is own;
The 'eathen in 'is blindness must end where 'e began,
But the backbone of the Army is the non-commissioned man!

Keep away from dirtiness -- keep away from mess.
Don't get into doin' things rather-more-or-less!
Let's ha' done with abby-nay, kul, an' hazar-ho;
Mind you keep your rifle an' yourself jus' so!

* abby-nay: Not now. kul: To-morrow. hazar-ho: Wait a bit.

Casey: I don't know about battlefield promotions being quite that common, especially as things exist nowadays. Back during the draft, I can see how some random kid could be drug in and then eventually prove himself on the battlfield and be promoted. I don't think it happened that often, though, and even battlefield promotees are still required to attend officer schools and such. Also, during those times, the rank advancement was faster depending on the casualty rate, so a person with the right combination of skill, experience and luck could quickly move up the ranks with astonishing speed.

I don't know much of anything about battlefield promotion rates, though, so if someone has those figures handy, that would help.

But I think the situation is different nowadays with the volunteer system. Just about everyone fighting in a war has been in for some period of time preceeding the conflict, so it's not like they're a bunch of guys taken from the street, split-up into officer and enlisted according to level of education and processed through as quickly as possible to get them out fighting. The system we have is fairly rigid, everyone knows their role and the entrance system is well-defined and better refined. The training is in-depth, constant and I would guess instrumental in highlighting those people with leadership potnetial before any fighting actually begins. I'm sure there'll always be exceptions to the rule like the odd guy, who through chance demonstrates natural ability for leadership heretofore unknown before the war, but generally people are where they're supposed to be.

I can't really speak for the difference between peacetime and wartime in the Army or anything. I've been in for about 12 years, so the only difference betwen peace and war for me is the level of intensity and the presence of live ammunition. But I've had people shooting at me and my planes since I've been in. Baghdad, Mogadishu, Port au Prince-- it's all the same to me, except the people shooting speak different languages. For the most part, the war comes, you do your part and it passes. Then something else comes along and you repeat the process. I've been doing my wartime tasking since I've been in and I've yet to see any difference between a peacetime military and a wartime military. They re-arrange a few things here and there, but it's fundamentally the same animal. As an aside, it's fairly ironic that everyone criticized these humanitrian and peacekeeping missions through the 90's, yet we now have a core group of NCO's who are perfectly trained and experienced for the Iraqi occupation. I hope they're being employed appropriately.

I understand that in WWII, at times when casualties were frighteningly high, battlefield commissions were not uncommon, and you might well never wind up in OTC, just go from enlisted to officer and then muster out after the war.

But that was in times when thousands might die in a day. We lost 30,000 at Okinawa, as I recall. Just hideous. It's hard not to imagine that they'd have to start picking out sargeants to turn into lieutenants and lieutenants to turn into captains, sometimes literally overnight.

It's also hard not to hope we never get into that kind of warfare again. [shudder]

The great (really) French war leader, Turenne, once observed that the human heart is the starting point in all matters pertaining to war.
So far, the discussion has had to do with garrison, organization, and training.
Combat is different. I had a CO once who had served in parallel with a British unit. He referred to a detail digging a trench while a subaltern stood about with his swagger stick, doing nothing. My CO--as he was much later--asked the sergeant in charge of the detail whether he was annoyed at how the division of labor broke out. "No, sir," said the sergeant, "his job is to show us how to die."
The point is that the officer, at least the company grade guys, lead, drive, and set an example in combat which is not at all like anything else.
The concept of command distance is important. You cannot manage men up a hill into fire.
The subconscious idea of leadership and subordination is still required.
Thus the difference between enlisted and commissioned ranks still needs to be maintained, even socially.
Otherwise, all we have is a first-rate peacetime military.
Now,this is all dreadfully eighteenth century.
Not at all the here&now.
But blurring the distinction has been tried. Alexander Werth's "Russia at War" includes a discussion of how Stalin felt it necessary for the success of the war to allow the officer corps the old privileges and distinction which had been thought to be Czarist in origin and a threat to the Party, and originally considered suspect.
Being an officer of American volunteers is different than being an officer of WW II Russian conscripts. But being an officer of American volunteers was different from being an officer of regulars even in our Civil War. As Bruce Catton said, some of the old Army types never got the hang of it.
But we still need the difference.

I suspect if we get into that level of war again we will have a similar pattern of battlefield commision amoung the E-5 to E-7 level moving to O-1. Without formal officer training they will probably never move beyond O-3. Its easier and better to leave a platoon currently in combat in the hands of a leader it knows... at least while its in a combat zone. And then you might as well give him the commission if he wants it and did well. This may have changed a bit with the move to an all volunteer force, but I doubt it has, we just haven't had anything to seriously test it.

Current pattern for mustangs is for about E-4s to step out, and that'll be less common in a major war, because we probably won't be able to spare the jr leaders from the war.

Of course by major war, I mean something in which we would be opperating at the edge of our military capabilities for more than a year. We haven't done anything that qualified since Vietnam. It has to be long enough, hard enough, and large enough to run through our current training pipeline, pull the beauracrats out and streamline command structures, and still be short of officers to lead platoons.

While theres little difference for the men involved in the recent military opperations (you can end up just as dead, just as quick), from an army's standpoint there's a huge difference in how demanding the opperations are in a long war.

And Dean, while I'm willing to hope that none ever happens again, I'd rate the chance of that at somewhere around 'when pigs fly'. But then I'm enough of an optomist to think we will eventually have enough space in which to fight that kind of war again. And enough of a pessimist to expect that someone will think that war is a good idea, not long after we find that space. It may not happen in our life, but never is a hell of a long time.

Okay, Sarge, I'll try googling '"battlefield promotions" world war two'.

One good hit was
http://www.angelfire.com/ma4/handsonhistory/ww2/3rd_army_history.htm
(sorry about the length), which mentions some of the achievements of the US Third Army. These include:
"Normal promotions numbered 6,464; battlefield promotions totaled 1,817; and combat appointments totaled 848.'

Now, I've never encoutered the term "combat appointments" before, so maybe you'll know better than I what those are. But if you take just the first two numbers, it turns out that 22 percent of the promotions awarded were battlefield. I would dig for more, but I'm a touch short of time right this minute. :)

As for the difference between peactime/wartime military, I just follow history, as well as several good authors; Jim Dunnigan's Shooting Blanks: War Making That Doesn't Work is an excellent choice, as it includes the number of generals that were sacked at the beginning of each major war in the 20th century. The French had some of the highest averages, while the Germans had some of the lowest. And you'd think generals would be ready, after an entire lifetime of preparing... :)

Dean: I don't think the WW2 experience depended so much on "thousands [dieing] in a day" as the fact that, when you are fighting a major war, you can see very quickly who's doing well, and who's not. Some of the incompetants got themselves killed, but a fair number of them got their own soldiers killed instead, such as McClellan, Westmoreland, and Clark. (oops, cheap shot, sorry {heh})

Seriously, there have been a lot of flag officers who looked good on paper, or did well in class, but sucked on the battlefield. McClelland is an excellent example. Grant, on the other hand, didn't have a very strong class ranking at the Academy, and (if I recall correctly) Sherman needed a fifth year to complete.

Of course, it's not that easy to spot, as there are men who are good on paper, and in action, such as Lee, Patton, and Eisenhower.

Sarge: to get back to your later point, I think your experience helps explain the present incredibly high quality of the US armed forces. They've had a lot of "on the job training" since the Gulf War, which is really the only way to keep your edge.

Historically, armies spend more time at peace, than at war. In the US, for example, we had long periods of peace for most of our history: 1782-1812, 1814-1846, 1846-1860, 1865-1917, 1918-1942...

I suppose the question arises: how do you measure things like the Frontier Wars, Marine peacekeeping between the world wars, and the Cold War?

A note: the Gulf War experience was a major anomaly, especially for the US! Normally, an army that hasn't fought for 20 years needs a year or two to get back in shape, and in America it's usually been at least two years of war (or preparation) to get the job done. But in 1992, for the first time in its history, the US Army hit the ground running, and the enemy never had a chance.

And the advantage has been growing ever since. Sometimes I wonder if this is a good thing. When the political leaders know they have the best soldiers around, they encounter a lot more temptation to use them, whether it's a good idea, or not (witness Somalia and Liberia).

Casey,

A thing to consider about U.S. performance in the Gulf, was the effect of the Cold War. While you can't directly assume that the Cold War kept the U.S. military on its toes the entire time, the experience of Korea did a lot to convince planners that they couldn't revert to the citizen-soldier army popular in American culture, simply because they couldn't rely on the "bad guys" to do so either.

That, coupled with the Reagan build-up following the Vietnam backlash essentially meant that from about 1983-on the military had been in pseudo-warfighting mode. Coupled with experience in Lebanon, Iran, Libya, Panama, Grenada, et al., the Gulf War was not the kind of abrupt transition from peacetime that we saw at the outset of World War II. This combined with the multitude of blessings given to us by our mission, enemy, time, troops and terrain laid the stage for an beating which rated right up their with Agincourt.

For a good sense of historical tempo, take a look at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/coldwar-ops.htm.

As you assert there are long streches of semi-peace, but it is equally worthwhile to consider them long streches of semi-war between big wars.

I'm older than Sensing and a retired military officer too; the Air Force is my service. It's amazing how little the civilian world knows about our armed forces, who they are, and how much better they (the services) are than the average civilian employer. The quality present now did not come without a struggle.

Back in the early '70s the Army, especially, was facing an incredibly difficult situation. The All Volunteer Force was being implemented, i.e., the draft was gone and all the services had to recruit people rather than conscript them. For the record, the Air Force, Navy and the Marine Corps hadn't relied on conscription since, at least, Korea and maybe earlier than that. The advantages of education and leadership training already were known and the three services I just mentioned were getting into it big time. The Army was still mired in a fairly low-tech way of thinking about things, but they were getting replacement equipment that the conscripts were unable to operate and maintain. At one point there was some consideration for developing the technical manuals in a comic book form so that the conscripts would have a better chance of understanding what they had to do.

Here we are, over thirty years later, and all that wasteful Pentagon spending that you've heard about for so many years is paying off handsomely. Yes, all of our armed forces are much "flatter" than anyone in civilian life can imagine. My brother retired from a large telecommunications firm whose management style is straight out of WWII -- "can you hear me now?" Their marketers put up a good front, but if they ever face any real competition they'll go down like a house of cards. The management are chasing out all of their good people, i.e., the ones with initiative and the ability act without being told to. All the armed forces have been nurturing those skills for decades now.

I can give you the viewpoint from the Navy side. The metaview is that the enlisted are the technical/subject matter experts while the officers are the planners/managers.

My experience comes as a Naval Officer who was a ship driver aka Surface Warfare. My first division (platoon for you ground pounders) was electronic technicians. They maintained the radars (non fire control), radios and computers on board ship.

I was a fresh Ensign with an Aeronautical Engineer Degree. I knew enough about electronics not to grab a capacitor but that was about it. My ET's, especially my Senior Chief (E-7), were my experts.

My job was to make sure they got the training they needed, check the paperwork, and learn what I could from them. A definate 'hands off' manager.

The biggest duty I had was the responsibility for the performance of the division. The enlisted were accountable for their duties but I was there to 'take the heat' so to speak when thing did not go well.

As a former Army E-5 who is currently an Air Force 0-2, I find myself wanting desperately to add something to the conversation. Unfortunately, I got here late enough that most of the good points have already been made.
I'd like to tweak some of the points, tho.
First, you cannot compare an E-4 to an O-4. While things go somewhat faster in the Army, I came in as an E-3 (I had some college), made E-5 within 4 years and was a few months away from E-6 when I transferred over. You will never find an officer with a similar timeline. You will never see a line officer (one holding command positions) coming in as anything other than O-1, first of all, and even in the Army, you can't make O-5 until you've been in about 16 years (unless that's changed recently). You are supposed to get more time to season as an officer before getting moved up.
But in the Army, you are in charge of a platoon within 2 years of joining up. You can be in command of a flight (an equivalent size, or so) in the Air Force right out of tech school sometimes, or within 4 years usually. But you won't be the senior enlisted at the platoon level until you are an E-6 with at least 8 or so years of service in the Army, and about the same in the Air Force as well (although that can vary far more widely, depending on the job classification).

And when I hear of an enlisted complaining about the pay disparity between officers and enlisted with similar time in service and education levels, I point out:
If someone in the unit dies needlessly, the senior NCO will get spoken to, perhaps reprimanded, and will have a black mark on his record. But the Officer in charge will no longer have a career, and may even get jail time.
If the plane doesn't take off on time, the Senior NCO will get a bad evaluation. The Officer in charge will get fired and will be doing paperwork until they are discharged.
If the hill doesn't get taken, the senior NCO may lose rank and have to earn back a stripe or two. The Officer, if not already dead, will be up on charges for dereliction of duty.
"To whom much is given, much is expected"
So, no, I don't think we should blend the officer and enlisted track.
I do think the Army should stop using the Warrant Officer as a cheaper Commissioned Officer, tho, and I do think the Air Force needs a Warrant Officer program.
To explain: a Warrant Officer is an enlisted who has become an expert at a job, and is so valuable at doing that job that you cannot risk having a junior officer (or very senior NCO, for that matter) mess things up in their ignorance by pulling rank.
Finally, while any officer nominally outranks any enlisted, no matter how senior, the prudent junior officer shows an informal respect, and listens to the voice of experience. The imprudent junior officer usually doesn't last long...

RE: hit the ground running.

The major reason we didn't need any real prep time prior to Gulf War I was that we train like we fight. It's my understanding that in previous times, the peacetime Army would be garrisoned for long stretches of time and the training wasn't as complete or intense as we have nowadays. I figured they'd march around a bit and get the fundamentals down, but I'm not sure if they continually fought adversaries as a form of regular training.

In the modern military, everyone's training against opposing forces in about as realistic fashion as possible, all the time. My cousins in the Army said that Iraq was just like the training they got, except they were taking live fire and the enemy wasn't as smart as their OPFOR's. In fact, they said they tended to overestimate what the enemy would do and how he would react until they figured out the enemy wasn't that bright and would basically just sit there and let them kill him. "Fish in a barrel" is how one of my cousins described it and the other one keeps bitching about how he feels the Iraqi War dulled his edge because the war wasn't as valuable as his training. He keeps saying it was like a remedial training exercise, like the type you get if you haven't done it in a while and need some basic refresher training before you get back to the real game.

As far as a major war happening and placing us in a situation similar to WW II: I don't see it happening in the near or mid-term future. Just the way everything's set-up and everything's planned seems to be from a viewpoint of eliminating the need for large groups of men being used for fodder against an enemy.

Oh, yeah. I can sum up why we are the best military in a handful of words comprising two concepts:
A professional NCO corps
and
Realistic, complex training

Only Britain and Israel come close.

I lived through the transition from a citizen army WWII (Korean Conflict) style to the volunteer army of today. One thing never changed and never will. The Officers set policy, The NCOs administer policy and the soldiers act on it. One reason the USA has such an effective fighting force is each soldier is encouraged to THINK. From the Turk, Japanese, German, Israeli, British, and even French military we have learned and adopted those concepts which would advance our goals. Every soldier after a couple of days in combat today, knows his/ her life depends solely on support from those around him/ her. Loyalty to comrades in arms and knowledge of the methods used is much more than fancy gadgets which can and will break down and leave you in trouble. The soldier, airman, seaman, marine is indispensable and must be the best in the world for us to continue.

Kudos to those who have fought our wars and those who continue to.

SFC W. M. Johnson
USArmy Retired

As someone who has spent time as an enlisted member (EM) as well as an officer (OF), I may have a unique insight.
First, let me explain pay grades vs. ranks. E-1 is a pay grade. In the Army it’s Private. In the Air Force it’s Airman (or something). In the Navy it’s Seaman. Likewise with officers. O-1 is 2nd Lieutenant in all services but Navy (Ensign).
There’s an idiom in the Army that NCOs are the backbone of the Army. This is true and is proven on a day-to-day basis whether in combat operations or in peace (garrison) operations. They make the Army work, as in operate. It’s the officers that plan the operations.

To illustrate, 2LT (O-1) Lostboy has just been assigned to his first duty position, Platoon Leader of 2nd Platoon (tank), A Troop, of a Div Cav. His commander, Captain (CPT O-3) Feathersword introduces him to his Platoon Sergeant, SFC (E-7) Halftrack and says to SFC Halftrack, “Bring the young LT up to speed on the platoon’s training.” SFC Halftrack takes 2LT Lostboy to platoon cage and goes through the individual and crew training records for the platoon and notes where the platoon members and crews are Trained, need Practice, or Untrained. He also notes that CPT Feathersword has rated the platoon TPU on various platoon level tasks. He then gives the LT a copy of the Training Schedule and Training Assessments compiled by the former platoon leader.
2LT Lostboy gives wide-eyed nods the entire time then reports back to the CO. The CO hands the LT a copy of the Yearly Training Calendar and the commander’s Training Guidance. He also tells the LT that there are personality issues in the platoon that are affecting platoon cohesion. Deal with it.
Several days later there is a troop training meeting. CPT Feathersword announces that the Squadron (Battalion) is going to Gunnery soon and it is his intent that one of his platoons will earn Top Gun. “Platoon Leaders, make it happen.”
2LT Lostboy turns to SFC Halftrack with a classic “Help me!” look.
They retire to the platoon cage and they tackle the TPU assessments of the crews. SFC Halftrack helps 2LT Lostboy identify gunnery weaknesses and prioritize them. SFC Halftrack helps the LT identify the resources needed to complete the gunnery training successfully. 2LT Lostboy asks SFC Halftrack about the personality issues in the platoon. The SFC explains the situation and what he has done to correct it. 2LT Lostboy, in a burst of insight, asks about the maintenance level of the platoons tanks. SFC Halftrack briefs him on some problems with the tanks and the status of repair parts.
2LT Lostboy goes to brief the commander on his training plan. The CO likes it and approves it. He then has the other platoon leaders join them for some sand table exercises (playing with little tanks on a terrain board.)
Meanwhile, SFC Halftrack heads out to the motor pool to check on the platoon. He confirms what he already knows about the maintenance issues, settles a dispute between the tank commander of the LT’s wingman and the gunner of the LT’s tank over who gets the bore sight next, then heads to the maintenance office to see the Troop XO 1LT (O-2) Blackfive and the Maintenance Sergeant, SFC Wrench (E-7).
He asks SFC Wrench why the parts that have come in are still in his “bin” and not “hung” on the tanks. SFC Wrench says he’s short-handed with two soldiers at NCO schools and one on emergency leave. We have to prioritize and LT Blackfive sets the priority. SFC Halftrack hunts down 1LT Blackfive who has just returned from the Squadron Maintenance Officer’s weekly meeting. 1LT Blackfive explains that the parts for a tank from 4th platoon and for several CFV’s of 1st and 3rd platoon had come in at the same time and those vehicles were deadlined (showing as inoperative on the maintenance report) and that it was making the entire Troop look bad. Since the 2nd Platoon tanks were not deadlined, they wait.
SFC Halftrack tells his tank commanders and the LT’s gunner to meet him in the cage at 1500 to talk about gunnery. He then heads to the First Sergeant’s (1SG E-8) office to coordinate chow for next week’s platoon trip to the range.
At the 1630 formation, the 1SG details what will happen the next day. He announces a change to the duty roster for CQ the next day and that the CO wants to go on a loooooooooong run tomorrow rather than the scheduled short run. (CQ = Charge of Quarters, i.e., manning the phones at night.) After the formation, the 1SG turns the platoons over to the platoon sergeants. SFC Halftrack tells 2nd platoon to head to the cage for a “talk” from the LT. 2LT Lostboy is waiting for the platoon and gives them a “hu-ahh” speech on teamwork. He says he has been observing the platoon for the last week and has noticed some “personality conflicts.” He tells every one to get over it and to focus on the mission.

So what have we learned? It seems that every one here has certain explicit and implied duties. We also see that SFC Halftrack is the man who makes things happen for 2nd platoon. He does it all. He can obviously do 2LT Lostboy’s job. He could probably perform 1LT Blackfive’s job. If called upon, he could also act as the commanding officer. This comes from years of experience.
Everything that happens on a day to day basis comes from the training schedule. The training schedule is a compilation of training plans from each platoon submitted by each platoon leader to the commander. The commander tweaks the plan then sends it up to Squadron to be approved. Months before any training takes place, the Squadron Commander gets guidance from the Division Commander (BG O-7) on what he wants the Squadron to do focus on in battle. “LTC Owen, based on our likely deployment scenarios for the next several years, I have determined that my Cav Squadron had better be proficient at providing Screens for my maneuver brigades. You will also likely have to perform a recon mission of the division’s battle space.”
The Squadron Commander takes this information and adds other priorities to it before passing it along. He may designate a certain Troop to focus on Area Recon over Screen. He sets dates for proficiency sends the Troop Commanders on their way along with guidance on how to achieve those priorities.
The Troop Commanders look at the priorities, add other priorities and goals, he will usually include the 1SG in this. What we have call this list of priorities is a Company/Troop METL (Mission Essential Task List). Each echelon above has a METL that the METL below is based upon. The commander’s plan to meet the METL is determined by the training assessments from last year’s training. Last year’s training was planned at the platoon level by 2LT Lostboy with guidance and input from SFC Halftrack.
Next year, 2LT Lostboy won’t need as much guidance and input from SFC Halftrack. The year after that, 1LT Lostboy will be gone to a staff job at Squadron or a Scout platoon. SFC Halftrack will be mentoring another 2LT.
Every Division Commander starts out as some version of 2LT Lostboy. Every SFC Halftrack starts out as Private “What The Hell Are Doing This Crazy Shit For” Snuffy. When the shit hits the fan, instead of passing down METLs. The senior officers are passing down movement and engagement orders. Those orders find their way to 2LT Lostboy who leads his platoon on a movement to contact mission as the lead element of the Division. He orders his platoon into a certain formation and gives the order to move out. Everything that happens to the men and tanks of 2nd platoon after they cross the line of departure is the responsibility of 2LT Lostboy. That’s why he’s an officer. SFC Halftrack has his back in the heat of battle, collecting casualty reports, fuel and ammo status, passing them on to 2LT Halftrack and ensuring the platoon is acting as the well oiled machine that he trained.

This is a great topic and I'm glad Dean opened it. I think readers of this and other blogs need this kind of engagement with the military, which is, after all, a fairly important part of our constitutional fabric. As I never tire of explaining to my civilian friends, nowhere in my copy of the Constitution do I find any mention of the departments of Health and Human Services, HUD, Education, etc.

I am a retired U.S. Army officer, who received a direct appointment from enlisted to officer status during Vietnam. What it says on the paperwork is something to the effect that having demonstrated great potential for discharging duties as an officer, blah, blah, blah. Nowhere in that paperwork is a "promotion" mentioned. In the military, a promotion is in recognition of meritorious service at one grade—within the same system, enlisted or officer. Going from enlisted to officer is an appointment, with all of the folderol, e.g., "the president of the United States, having reposed great faith," etc., etc. I bring this up only to clarify those WWII statistics cited earlier. "Normal" promotions would be those tendered upon attainment of the requisite time in grade. "Battlefield" promotions would be accelerated promotions, e.g., from E5 to E6, or 02 to 03, based on outstanding performance. "Combat appointments" are those from enlisted to officer status. This was a fairly common occurrence in WWII because of attrition in junior officer ranks, but less so in Korea and Vietnam. With the extremely low casualty rates in today's Army and Marine Corps, I expect that such appointments will be exceedingly rare.

Dean began this topic with the question as to whether the U.S. should do away with the distinction between officer and enlisted. My vote is with those who've argued against it. First, I suspect many civilians don't know that U.S. military officers are officers under the Constitution; their appointments and promotions must be approved by the Senate. Why is this? Well, because our Founders, who knew their history, knew that any internal threat to the government would necessarily include the military. That's why military officers take an oath to the Constitution—not to the president or any other person. This means that officers—unlike enlisted personnel—are bound in a very unique way to the nation itself and NOT to any particular commanding general or president. This was all explained to me years ago and I have always taken it very seriously. I like our system the way it is and I would not like to see it changed.

The utilitarian argument against eliminating the two hierarchies is very simple. Although the fundamental reality is subject to confusion because of low casualty rates, standoff weapons, overwhelming technical superiority, etc., the bottom line is that the officer is the guy who has to order people into harm's way. No matter whether he likes them, no matter whether they got drunk and played poker the night before, the officer is the guy who does the job that no one else wants. If you fuzz that line, you don't get the job done. We don't want debating societies in the military. And, in my experience, enlisted personnel understand this.

I made E7 at the age of 25. I accepted the appointment as an officer because there was realistically little chance of further rapid advancement in the enlisted ranks and also because I liked the idea of the additional responsibility. Although I took a pay cut initially, I never regretted it. I also never went to a training school. The Army had a short course we called "knife and fork school," but I received a waiver on attendance because I had a college degree. In the interests of full disclosure, I should also note that mine was a different career, spent mostly in so-called special mission units—which means I am by no means an expert on the more traditional military units.

What I see of today's military, I like a lot. They are the best forces in the world and they deserve an enormous amount of respect for their contributions to our nation's security. Let's just not burn them out. The pipeline is not unlimited.

DarthVOB, Jeff Wright, Dean and Friends,

I read a LONG essay on Why Arab Armies Lose, and key in there were the observations that American NCOs form the cohesive tissue AND the backbone which bring together planners and doers. Very much an 'ace-in-the-hole'.

While this is a cultural factor, the absence of such NCOs and the absence of their necessary functions in Arab armies shows, by contrast, WHY America needs this setup. Its NOT just 'thats how its been for a long time,' but more like, 'that works!' Period.

America, too, is noted as fielding a superbly educated armed forces, and this is a sign of America's excellence. While it FLATTENS the command structure, I see no way that a hierarchy of command can EVER be eliminated. Initiative and 'can-do!' and 'step-up' notwithstanding, there are too many jobs for one group of people to do, hence specialization, and Hot Damn! America's got that happening very well!

Last note: American armed services recognize that enlisted, Non-Commissioned and Commissioned Officers have the lion's share, but there ARE legitimate places for Warrant Officers (or the like), special hybrids who have highly technical jobs or highly-specialized functions, out of place in the NCO ranks, but often drawn from the enlisted... (and nobody mentioned it previously this thread:)

Me? I'm a 4-year ASA Vet who learned Korean at the DLI, then served my E4-E5 time on mountain-tops on the DMZ, teaching at the DLI, and again on a mountain-top just south of the Z, in the wake of the USS Pueblo affair... I'm all for the all-volunteer armed services we see today, and I'm very proud of their efforts in Iraq and elsewhere!

As an officer of the German Airforce reserve and former instructor in basic training, this discussion was interesting to observe. You might be aware of the drastic reduction of German military forces over the past years. The objective is to focus on quality not quantity. I think we have impressively proven in the past that forced service for all results in unmotivated armed forces and a lack of true professionalism. I remember vividly being a 19 year old basic training instructor supposed to be shouting at a 27 year old doctor and father of two. The abusrdity let me to understand that our system did not work. Too many frustrated, low educated men which did not face a chance of a job and much less chance of being able or allowed to tell other people what to do in industry, joined the armed forces and used their power to make themselves feel important.

The German armed forces which include men having to do mandatory serive will never be as good as those forces made up entirely of professionals. Wanting to do the job is one of the key motivators. Needing to perform well in order to be considered for promotion is another key factor. Both of those do not apply to recruits doing their mandatory service time and mostly considering this service a waste of their time on the path to doing what they really want to do.

The units which include significant numbers of mandatroy service recruits also tend to rely most strongly on rigid command and control structures since these make it easier to be repeated over and over again as the mandatory service soldiers leave every 6-9 months.

The model has to be that of the best armed forces in the world. An exclusively professionally army which consists of soldiers by choice interested in furthering their careers, doing their jobs well and passionately defending their country and ideals.

I have just a question, I know this might sound dumb but after retiring and have lost a strip for weight problems, is it possible to regain that strip in, (I'm not sure what it call it) some kind of retirement form? Its a close friend to mine, a family member to be exact. I wish i could help, can i write some one that can make it possible? it would mean so much to this person and i love him very much, i wish i could do it for him because he loved the military so much and still does. I just don't know if it possible, there would be no need for any financial gane nor anything els, just the fact that he could wear it again with the memories he loved.

thank you

Dear Sir, im employed by the Army Corps OF Engs. IM an ex-navy man so im not familiar with ranks in the army.. im an WK_10 step 5.. what is that in inlisted terms as far as the army is concerned like e-3 ect.... thanks bob

ARMY, AIR FORCE, NAVY, MARINES four Institutions for one country, but four diferent ideas.

Who is the Best????
I had the chance to experience, and I am very proud to nine years of service in the Marines, I will never change those 9 years for anything.
Now I have the chance to expend 3 years in the "ARMY OF ONE" and so far I am very disapointed, by the way of the structure, leadership, ideology, schedule, within other aspects.
When I came in the Army I was all for it, I looked at it as a new experience, until one day a SFC (Sergeant First Class/ E-7) volunteer myself to go to the field. I just got to the unit to replace the Supply Sergeant who was in process of PCS to Germany. When at school I had learned the basics for my MOS, was not enough to know the Supply System. So there I was in the field, where for 45 days the only thing I did was answer the telephone, what a waste of time. After a few months trying to adapt at the Army schedule and their ideology, which I still can't adapt; I realize that everybody are in the bussiness of looking pretty, but they did not have an idea of what they were doing. One time I got my a... handle by my so call First Sgt. because I did not want to write an award for a soldier who was PCS'ing they want me to write an Army Achievement Medal, I said that I had no basis on what to write that award because the soldier had not ACHIEVE anything out of their normal daily routine, I was told that every soldier who PCS has to have an award. Well figure that out, an Army Achievement Medal just for PCS, what a joke! while in the Marines you have to be able to walk over water to get one. I had been award a Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal while I was in the Marines for a NOT FINDING (no mistakes) ispection by the FSMO TEAM.
The platoon sergeant, so call Motor Pool Sergeant got a MSM, Meritorious Service Medal for PCS'ing with an average readiness of the Motor Pool at below 60%. On the other hand I was the Platoon Sergeant with 39 Marines under my command, Operations-Maintenance NCO with 64 pieces of rolling equipment and a average of 98.9% radiness while deployed aboard the USS Nassau and Oak Hill with MSSG 24, what I got: "A JOB WELL DONE" and I was proud of that./ my First Sergeant from the Marines got a MSM, for 22 years of service after he retired "THAT IS MERITOURIOUS SERVICE",

NCO's in the Army you are not considered an NCO until you get promoted to a Sergeant/E-5, which wil take you only about 2 1/2 to 3 years, in the Marines you are a NCO as a Corporal/E-4 wich will take you an average of 3 1/2 to 4 years if you are good enough.
I meet a SSGT/E-6 in the Army that he has a baby face, and
I asked him how old he was: he said 23,
I was surprise, so I asked him how long he was in the service he said about 5 years, I was even more surprise, he never was deployed or had any real life field experience, but he replied that he had worked his but to get promoted, so my question is: What kind of leadership experience does he has???
I don't know if I am in the wrong unit or the wrong place but my experience in the Army has been very disapointed, maybe because I had been brain wash by the green Marine Corps mentallity.

"I'M READY TO KILL, READY TO DIE BUT NEVER WILL, CAUSE I'M A GREEN MEAN FIGHTING MACHINE I AM A US MARINE"

SEMPER FI

In memory of all service members of the Armed Forces and all my fellow MARINES.